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A Pairing-Based Anonymous Credential System
with Efficient Attribute Encoding
(Technical Report)?
Syh-Yuan Tan and Thomas Groß
Newcastle University, UK
Abstract. We propose new multi-show anonymous attribute-based cre-
dential system that is provably secure in the standard model under the q-
SDH assumption. The corresponding proof system incorporates efficient
show proofs for logical statements AND, OR and NOT. Each statement
requires only a constant number of bilinear pairing operations by the ver-
ifier and none by the prover. The system is based on the pairing-based
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme and offers a novel efficient at-
tribute encoding method which is of independent interest.
1 Introduction
An attribute-based anonymous credential (ABC) system allows a user to obtain
credentials, that is, certified sets of attributes, from issuers and to anonymously
prove the possession of these credentials. ABC system was first proposed by
Chaum [22] while the first practical ABC system was introduced by Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya (CL) [17] in which the user can demonstrate the possession
of his credential for multiple times while retaining unlinkability. The same au-
thors also proposed signature schemes with special algebraic properties [19, 20]
which allow the construction of multi-show ABC system that can bind multi-
ple attributes into a single credential. Their Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH)-based
signature [20] ported from Boneh et al.’s group signature [10] is the most ef-
ficient among all and has been applied in a number of anonymous credential
systems [6, 33, 2, 16, 31, 34, 7].
Au et al. [6] extended SDH-based CL signature [20] scheme to sign on blocks
of messages and due to the algebraic properties of the signature, the extended
scheme has the same signature size as the original scheme. They also showed that
their signature scheme can provide proof of possession protocol which resemble
an ABC system.
There have been a number of approaches to extend anonymous credential
schemes with different encodings. The traditional encoding employed by Ca-
menisch and Lysyanskaya [19] and other schemes on blocks of messages fixes
? Preliminary version published as Newcastle University technical report, TR-1527,
2019. A subsequent version was published in the Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report
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the i-th attribute as the i-th exponent to the i-th base and it has complexity, in
terms of the scalar multiplication operation, linear to the number of attributes in
the credential. A prime encoding first suggested by Camenisch and Groß [14] for
the SRSA CL Signature Scheme [19] offers show proofs for AND, NOT and OR
statements with a constant number of exponentiations for the specially encoded
attributes.
Exploiting the compression feature in SDH-based CL signature [20] and com-
bining with a newly proposed pairing-based accumulator, Camenisch et al. [16]
presented an ABC system that supports revocation. Later, Sudarsono et al. [31]
applied the accumulator on the attributes instead of user identity and showed
that the resulted ABC system can support show proof for AND and OR state-
ments with constant complexity. In the subsequent work, Zhang and Feng [34]
replaced the accumulator with a threshold encryption scheme to construct an
ABC system that can support show proof for threshold statement. Compared
to Au et al.’s basic ABC system [6], the public key size and credential size in
the two ABC systems are doubled. Besides, the ABC systems require a signing
operation for each attribute and involve at least 10 additional bilinear pairing
operations in the proof of possession protocol and show proofs.
To the best of our knowledge, the only ABC system in the standard model
that has show proof for AND, OR and NOT statements with constant complexity
is the ABC system proposed by Camenisch and Groß [14, 15]. Specifically, the
Camenisch-Groß encoding uses a product of prime numbers to represent binary
and finite-set attributes in a single exponent, a technique subsequently employed
to more complex data structures [26]. The proof of possession protocol and show
proof has linear computational complexity in terms of multiplications of prime
exponents, however only has a constant number of exponentiations. The show
proof for AND and OR statements can be efficiently constructed based on the
non-divisibility among prime numbers which represent an attribute each; while
the NOT statement is based on the co-primality among the prime numbers.
The authors pointed out that it is possible to apply the prime encoding on non-
RSA-based ABC system to support logical statements with constant complexity.
However, the suggested workaround comes with the price of additional zero-
knowledge proofs for RSA parameters and yields an ABC system which is slower
than their prime encoded RSA-based ABC system. It is thus interesting to know
whether there exists a non-RSA-based ABC system which is provably secure
in the standard model and can support show proof for AND, OR and NOT
statements efficiently, i.e., more efficient than adopting the prime encoding or
accumulators as in [31, 34].
Our Contribution. We present a novel efficient encoding method for ABC system.
Unlike the Camenisch-Groß encoding [15], it does not rely on pre-certified prime
numbers, yet is able to support the same expressiveness in logical statements
AND, NOT, and OR. Specifically, we encode the message m as the exponent
x′ +m such that x′ is a secret privy only to the issuer. Applying the encoding
to the SDH-based Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature [20], we obtain a signature
scheme with an efficient attribute encoding which is at least as secure as the
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former. We further show that the encoding is collision resistant under the SDH
assumption.
Next, we extend the signature scheme with attribute encoding into a multi-
show ABC system which efficiently supports the proof of possession protocol as
well as show proofs for AND, OR and NOT statements. Subsequently, we give a
direct proof in the standard model for the security against impersonation and
anonymity of the ABC system.
As a by-product from the proposed ABC system, we rigorously define a new
security model for the anonymity notion of ABC system. Our anonymity notion
is compatible to that of KVABC system [21, 7, 11] and covers the unlinkability
as well as the anonymity required by the state-of-the-art ABC systems [12, 24],
both of which we will discuss in related works (Section 2).
Organization. We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 contains related work,
especially ABCs from transformation frameworks and KVABCs. In Section 3,
we briefly describe the mathematical assumptions and the security notions of
attribute credentials system. In Section 4, we present the encoding method and
its application SDH-based CL signature scheme [20]. We present our ABC sys-
tem in Section 5 followed by discussion in Section 6. We conclude the paper in
Section 7.
2 Related Works
ABC from Transformation Frameworks. Camenisch et al. [12] as well as Fuch-
bauer et al. [24] proposed transformation frameworks for ABC system that are
relevant to our work. Camenisch et al.’s framework allows one to obtain an
ABC system from structure-preserving signature and vector commitment scheme
which has:
– non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs without random oracle
– show proof of constant size
– universal composability in the common reference string model
where their most efficient ABC system is based on the construction by Abe et
al. [1]. Fuchbauer et al.’s framework also uses the same ingredients but does not
yield universal composability and is proven secure in the generic group model
only. Camenisch et al. [12] explained that these three advantages in their ABC
system are the limitations of the ABC systems based on CL signatures, be it
RSA-based or SDH-based. Putting aside the universal composability and NIZK
proofs, we are skeptical on the view of the constant size protocol as there is an
exception [15] which can provide constant size show proof. Moreover, Camenisch
and Groß’ ABC system [15] also achieves constant complexity for the show proofs
but the frameworks [12, 24] cannot.
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Keyed-Verification ABC (KVABC). Chase et al. [21] opened another door for
ABC system, namely, keyed-verification ABC system (KVABC system) in which
the credential issuer and verifier share the same secret key using algebraic MAC.
Barki et al. [7] proposed a more efficient KVABC system based on a newly
proposed MAC scheme provably secure in the standard model. We see that their
MAC scheme is actually the SDH-based CL signature but in the use case scenario
of MAC where both issuer and verifier knows the signing key. Due to this, Barki
et al.’s KVABC system can be switched into a public key ABC system assuming
the verifier does not know the signing key, which is in fact the basic ABC system
by Akagi et al. and Au et al. Recently, Camenisch et al. constructed a KVABC
system [11] based on an algebraic MAC ported from the weakly secure Boneh-
Boyen signature [9] scheme. In view of the similar structure of the weakly secure
Boneh-Boyen signature and SDH-based CL signature, applying the traditional
encoding [15], the two KVABC systems also can provide show proof with linear
complexity.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Mathematical Tools
Bilinear Pairing. Let G1,G2,GT be groups of prime order p. Let g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈
G2 and x, y ∈ Zp where g1, g2 are the generators, the bilinear pairing function is
e : G1 ×G2 → GT with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(gx1 , g
y
2 ) = e(g
y
1 , g
x
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
xy
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1
3. Efficiency: e is efficiently computable.
Throughout this work, we will assume Type-3 pairing which has G1 6= G2.
Definition 1. Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DLOG). An algorithm C is said
to (tdlog, εdlog)-solve the DLOG assumption if C runs in time at most tdlog and
furthermore:
Pr[x ∈ Zp : C(g, gx) = x] ≥ εdlog
We say that the DLOG assumption is (tdlog, εdlog)-hard if no algorithm (tdlog, εdlog)-
solves the DLOG assumption.
Definition 2. q−Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SDH) [9]. An algorithm
C is said to (tsdh, εsdh)-solve the SDH assumption if C runs in time at most tsdh
and furthermore:
Pr[x ∈ Zp, c ∈ Zp \ {−x}] : C(g, gx, . . . , gxq) = (g 1x+c , c)] ≥ εsdh
We say that the SDH assumption is (tsdh, εsdh)-hard if no algorithm (tsdh, εsdh)-
solves the SDH assumption.
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Definition 3. Relation (R) [23]. Let R be a relation {(x,w(x))} testable in
polynomial time, where x is the secret and w(x) = {w1, . . . , |w(x)|} is the cor-
responding set of witnesses such that (x,w(x)) ∈ R and |x| = |wi| for 1 ≤ i ≤
|w(x)|.
Definition 4. Proof System (P, V ) [23]. A zero knowledge proof system (P, V )
over R is a pair of algorithms (P, V ) satisfying:
1. Completeness: The verifier V always accepts a true statement P (x,wi ∈
w(x)).
2. Soundness: The verifier V always rejects a false statement P (x,wi /∈ w(x))
except with a negligible probability.
3. Zero-knowledge: A simulator S exists for every true statement such that
(P (x,wi ∈ w(x)), V ) and S(x, V ) are polynomially indistinguishable.
Definition 5. Witness Indistinguishability (WI) [23]. An algorithm C is said to
(twi, εwi)-break the WI property of a proof system (P, V ) over a relation R if C
runs in time at most twi and furthermore:
|Pr[x, {w1 ∈ w(x)} ∈ R : C(P (x,w1), V ) = 1]−
Pr[x, {w2 ∈ w(x)} ∈ R : C(P (x,w2), V ) = 1]| ≥ εwi
We say that a proof system is (twi, εwi)-secure if no algorithm (twi, εwi)-break its
WI property.
3.2 Digital Signature Scheme
A digital signature scheme is defined by three algorithm as DS = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify)
as follows:
1. KeyGen.(1k)→ (pk, sk): A pair of public and secret keys are generated based
on the security parameter input 1k. The public key pk can be made known
to the public while the secret key sk is kept secret by the signer.
2. Sign.(m, pk, sk)→ σ: The signer uses the secret key sk to sign on a message
m, generating a signature σ.
3. Verify.(m,σ, pk) → 1/0: The verifier takes the signer’s public key pk and σ
as the input to ensure that the signature is genuinely signed by the signer.
If the signature is verified, the algorithm returns 1 and 0 otherwise.
3.2.1 Unforgeability We refer to the security notion of strong existential
unforgeability under chosen message attacks (seuf-cma) [9]. The security model
is defined as the following game between a forger F and a challenger C:
Game 1 (seufcma(F , C))
1. Setup: C runs KeyGen and sends pk F .
2. Phase 1: F is allowed to issue queries to the Sign oracle.
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3. Challenge: F outputs a challenge message m∗ which may have not been
queried to Sign oracle previously.
4. Phase 2: F can continue to query the Sign oracle as in Phase 1.
5. Forgery. F outputs a message and signature pair (m∗, σ∗) which is differ-
ent from all the previous replies from the Sign oracle. F wins the game if
Verify(m∗, σ∗, pk) outputs 1.
Definition 6. A forger F is said to (tsig, εsig)-break the seuf-cma security of a
signature scheme if F runs in time at most tsig and furthermore:
Pr[Verify(m∗, σ∗, pk) = 1] ≥ εsig.
We say that a signature scheme is (tsig, εsig)-secure if no forger (tsig, εsig)-breaks
the seuf-cma security of the signature scheme.
3.3 SDH-based CL Signature Scheme
The SDH-based CL signature scheme was first proposed in [20] and proven to
be seuf-cma-secure [6, 28] with a tight reduction [30] to the SDH assumption in
the standard model. We describe the signature scheme as follows:
KeyGen(1k): Construct three cyclic groups G1,G2,GT of order p based on an
elliptic curve whose bilinear pairing is e : G1 × G2 → GT . Select random gen-
erators a, b, c ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and a secret value x ∈ Z∗p. Output the public key
pk = (e,G1,G2,GT , p, a, b, c, g2, X = gx2 ) and the secret key sk = x.
Sign(m, pk, sk): On input m, choose the random values s, t ∈ Z∗p to compute:
v = (ambsc)
1
x+t
In the unlikely case where x+ t = 0 mod p occurs, reselect a random t. Output
the signature as σ = (t, s, v).
Verify(m,σ, pk): Given σ = (t, s, v), accept the signature if the following holds:
e(v,Xgt2) = e((a
mbsc)
1
x+t , gx+t2 )
= e(ambsc, g2)
Theorem 1. [30] SDH-based CL signature scheme is (tsig, εsig)-secure in the
standard model under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
3.4 Anonymous Credential System
To the best of our knowledge, there are only four rigorous definitions that come in
pair with their security models for anonymous credential system (ABC system)
in the literature [24, 2, 12, 29] but none of them suit our need in this work for
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a fair comparison on security and performance later on. After a careful consid-
eration, using Fuchsbauer et al.’s work [24] as the base, we build a more general
definition for ABC system and the corresponding security model. Firstly, we
embed the user key generation into the credential issuing protocol and exclude
the proprietary feature such as pseudonymization in Camenisch et al.’s ABC
system [12]. Secondly, we do not consider non-blind credential issuing protocol
as in Akagi et al.’s ABC system [2]. Thirdly, besides viewing the protocol tran-
script as one of the output from the credential issuing and proof of possessions
protocols as in Camenisch’s ABC system, we also view attributes as a part of the
credential. We highlight that this is important to allow our anonymity notion to
cover the non-standardized notions of anonymity and unlinkability to-date.
An anonymous credential system can be defined by five algorithms ABCsystem =
{KeyGen,Obtain, Issue,Prove,Verify} as follows:
KeyGen(1k, 1n) → (pk, sk). This algorithm is executed by the signer. On the
input of the security parameter k and the upper bound n of attribute sets, it
generates a key pair (pk, sk) for issuer.
(Obtain(pk,A), Issue(pk, sk)) → (pi1, cred/ ⊥). The first algorithm is executed
by the user. On the input of issuer’s public key pk and an attribute set A, it
generates a user secret key usk. The second algorithm is executed by the issuer
and takes as input the issuer’s public key pk and secret key sk. At the end of
this protocol, a proof pi1 on (usk,A) is produced. Obtain outputs the credential
cred if the proof pi1 is accepted by Issue or ⊥ otherwise.
(Prove(pk,A, cred,A′),Verify(pk,A′)) → (pi2, 1/0). The first algorithm is exe-
cuted by the credential holder which takes as input the issuer’s public key pk,
user secret key usk, signed attribute set A, user’s credential cred and a disclo-
sure attribute set A′. The second algorithm is executed by the credential verifier
which takes as input the issuer’s public key pk and the disclosure attribute set
A′. The verifier has the right to decide which protocol pi2 to run, either a proof
of possession protocol where A = A′ or a show proof on the {AND,OR,NOT}
statements. Verify outputs 1 if pi2 is valid or 0 otherwise.
3.4.1 Impersonation The security goal of an ABC system requires that it is
infeasible for an adversary to get accepted by the verifier, neither in the proof
of possesion nor the show proof. This security goal is termed as unforgeability
in the literature because the goal seems to boil down to the credential cred
which is a blinded signature. Specifically, an adversary should not be able to
complete a valid proof of possessions protocol without knowing a valid cred.
Correspondingly, it should be infeasible for an adversary to complete a valid
show proof without knowing a valid cred or a valid attribute set A, or both.
However, we highlight that the goal is only to have adversary rejected by the
verifier. So, examining adversary’s ability to possess a valid cred and A alone is
not sufficient. For instance, an adversary can be accepted even without a valid
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cred if the protocols are flawed. As a matter of fact, one can see that this security
goal is closely related to the security against impersonation in attribute-based
identification (ABI) scheme [32, 3] which requires that it is infeasible for an
adversary to impersonate as a user, i.e., an adversary cannot get accepted by
the verifier through the identification protocol.
The strongest attack which can be perfomed by an ABI adersary is the man-
in-the-middle attack, followed by the concurrent attacks, active attack and pas-
sive attack. It is well-known that three-move identification protocols such as the
sigma protocol cannot resist the man-in-the-middle attack but we argue that
the security against impersonation under concurrent attacks is sufficient in the
practice. This security notion allows the ABI adversary to concurrently corrupt
the user of his choice and play the role of verifier in the identification protocol.
Mapping this security notion to the ABC system scenario, it means ABC system
adversary should be allowed to query Obtain, Prove and Verify oracles, which is
exactly the state-of-the-art security notion of unforgeability for ABC system in
the literature [12, 24].
Therefore, it is natural for us to term the security model for ABC system
as the security against impersonation, instead of unforgeability, in the following
game between an adversary A and a challenger C.
Game 2 (Impersonation(A, C))
1. Setup: C runs KeyGen(1k, 1n) and sends pk to A.
2. Phase 1: A is able to issue queries to the Obtain, Prove and Verify ora-
cles where he plays the role of user, prover and verifier respectively on any
attribute sets A of his choice.
3. Challenge: A outputs a challenge attribute set A∗ 6⊆ A for every A queried
to the Obtain oracle during Phase 1.
4. Phase 2: A can continue to query the oracles as in Phase 1 with the re-
striction that it cannot query A to Obtain such that A∗ ⊆ A.
5. Forge: A completes a proof of possession or a show proof for a credential
cred∗ of A∗ and wins the game if Verify outputs 1.
Definition 7. An adversary A is said to (timp, εimp)-break the security against
impersonation of an anonymous credential system if A runs in time at most timp
and furthermore:
Pr[(A(pk,A∗, cred∗, ·),Verify(pk, ·)) = 1] ≤ εimp
We say that an anonymous credential system is (timp, εimp)-secure if no adversary
(timp, εimp)-breaks the security against impersonation of the anonymous credential
system.
3.4.2 Anonymity This security property requires that given polynomially
many valid pairs (pi∗2,b, A
∗) which belong to either user u0 or user u1 such that
A′ ⊆ A0
⋂
A1, it is infeasible for an adversary to decide the ownership of pi∗2,b
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where b ∈ {0, 1}. Inspired by a recent finding [25] on anonymity issues in the ABC
systems, we craft a new notion of anonymity such that it covers the anonymity
during the issuing protocol as well as during the proof of possession protocol. We
name this notion as full anonymity and it covers the well-accepted anonymity
properties in the literature [24, 2, 12, 29] where we view the attribute set as
a part of the credential and the adversary is allowed to corrupt both issuer
and verifier. Besides, our anonymity notion is stronger than the existing ABC
systems [24, 2, 12, 29] as we allow adversary to hold the issuer’s secret key sk
as required in KVABC [7, 11]. To be precise, these previous works also assume
adversary can collude with issuer but the sk is not known to the adversary. The
security model is defined as the following game between an adversary A and a
challenger C.
Game 3 (Anonymity(A, C))
1. Setup: C runs KeyGen and sends pk, sk to A.
2. Phase 1: A is able to make queries to the Obtain, Issue, Prove and Verify
oracles where he plays the role of user, issuer, prover and verifier respectively.
3. Challenge: A decides the two users u0, u1 and the non-empty attribute set
A∗ ⊆ A0
⋂
A1 which he wishes to challenge upon. u0, u1 and the correspond-
ing A0, A1 can be taken from the existing queries in Phase 1. C responds by
randomly choosing the challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1} and interacts as the prover
with A as the verifier to complete the protocol
pi2,b = (Prove(pk,Ab, credb, A
∗),Verify(pk,A∗))
for a polynomially many time as requested by A.
4. Phase 2: A can continue to query the oracles as in Phase 1.
5. Guess: A outputs a guess b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
T1
Definition 8. An adversary A is said to (tano, εano)-break the security against
full anonymity of an anonymous credential system if A runs in time at most tano
and furthermore:
|Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
| ≤ εano
We say that an anonymous credential system is (tano, εano)-secure if no adversary
(tano, εano)-breaks the security against full anonymity of the anonymous credential
system.
In the weaker notion [18] which assumes the issuer as a trusted party, the
adversary A is not allowed to access the Issue oracle throughout the game, we
term such notion as weak anonymity.
T1 TGr: Walk through finite-set anonymity.
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Definition 9. An adversary A is said to (twano, εwano)-break the security against
weak anonymity of an anomymous credential system if A runs in time at most
twano and furthermore:
|Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
| ≤ εwano
We say that an anonymous credential system is (twano, εwano)-secure if no adver-
sary (twano, εwano)-breaks the security against weak anonymity of the anonymous
credential system.
4 Efficient Attributes Encoding
In this section, we show how to encode and compress an attribute set A =
{m1, . . . ,mn} into a single message m of the SDH-based CL signature scheme.
Recall that an attribute mi is encoded as (x′+mi) where x′ is not known to the
user, multiple attributes then has the form m = (x′+m1)(x′+m2) . . . (x′+mn).
This encoding mechanism has several useful features. The first is the encoded
attribute length where an attribute set of arbitrary length n is always a single
element in Zp. Secondly, the existing signing optimization [28] is still applicable
since signer knows x′. Thirdly, the encoded attribute set can be viewed as a
monic polynomial m =
∑n
i=0 αix
′i where every αi ∈ Z∗p can be found within
2n − n− 1 multiplications and ∑ni=1 (ni)− 1 additions in Zp using the recursive
searching algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1.
This enables anyone who knows A to verify the signature without the need
to know x′ and is also the main ingredient to realize the logical statements
in our proposed ABC system. The latter is from the fact that
∑n
i αix
′i =
c(x′)
∑n−k
i βix
′i + d where c(x′), d ∈ Z∗p can be computed from long division
such that c(x′) =
∑k
i ωix
′i and k is the number of attributes disclosed in a show
proof. We can see that although our show proof is not as efficient as that based on
the prime encoding [15], ours yields the first pairing-based ABC system whose
show proof can efficiently support the AND, OR and NOT logical statements.
Lastly, the encoding supports both non-indexed and indexed attributes because
the attributes does not need to fix to the bases as in the traditional encoding.
4.1 SDH-based Encoded-Message CL Signature Scheme
We apply the message encoding on SDH-based CL signature [20] T2 scheme
and evaluate its security after the modification. This encoded-message signature
scheme will be the building block for our multi-show anonymous credential sys-
tem in the next section.
T2 TGr: Does this scheme operate on SDH-CL [20] itself or use Au et al.’s version.
Should apply to both.
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Algorithm 1 convertToAlphas(): Convert attribute set into αs
Input: Attribute set A = {m1, . . . ,mn} and prime order p.
Output: L = {α0, . . . , αn}.
Post-conditions:
∑n
i=0 αix
′i = (x′ +m1)(x′ +m2) . . . (x′ +mn)
1: i← 1
2: n← |A|
3: L[n+ 1]← {1}
4: val← 1
5: lvl← 1
6: procedure toAlphas(val, lvl, i)
7: if i = n then
8: return (val, lvl)
9: end if
10: while i < n do
11: temp← toAlpha(val ×A[i] mod p, lvl + 1, i+ 1)
12: if L[n− temp.lvl + 1] =⊥ then
13: L[n− temp.lvl + 1]← L[n− temp.lvl + 1] + temp.val
14: else
15: L[n− temp.lvl + 1]← temp.val
16: end if
17: i← i+ 1
18: end while
19: return (val, lvl)
20: end procedure
21: return L
KeyGen(1k): Construct three cyclic groups G1,G2,GT of order p based on an
elliptic curve whose bilinear pairing is e : G1 × G2 → GT . Select random gen-
erators a, b, c ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and two secret values x, x′ ∈ Z∗p. Compute the values
ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
to output the public key pk = (e,G1,G2,GT , p, a, ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
, b, c, g2, X =
gx2 ) and the secret key sk = (x, x′).
Sign(m1, . . . ,mn, pk, sk): Select a randomm1 ∈ Z∗p as the user secret key. On the
input of attributes m2, . . . ,mn, choose the random values s, t ∈ Z∗p to compute:
v =
(
a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mi)bsc
) 1
x+t
and output the signature as σ = (t, s, v).
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Verify(m,σ, pk): Given σ = (t, s, v), compute αi ∈ Z∗p for 0 ≤ i ≤ n such that∏n
i=1(x
′ +mi) =
∑n
i=0 αix
′i. Output 1 if the following holds:
e(v,Xgt2) = e
( n∏
i=0
(ax
′i
)αibsc
) 1
x+t
, gx2g
t
2

= e
(
n∏
i=0
(ax
′i
1 )
αibsc, g2
)
and output 0 otherwise.
4.2 Security Analysis
We use the naming ‘basic signature scheme’ as the shorthand for the original
SDH-based CL signature scheme [20], and ‘encoded-message signature scheme’
as the shorthand for the signature scheme with the new message encoding pro-
posed in Section 4.1, that is, original SDH-based CL signature scheme with the
proposed encoding applied on the messages.
Theorem 2. If the encoded-message signature scheme is (tencode, εencode)-secure,
then the basic signature scheme is (tbasic, εbasic)-secure such that:
εencode = εbasic, tencode = tbasic
where tbasic, tencode are the time taken to forge a basic signature and an encoded-
message signature, respectively.
Proof. Given the public key of basic scheme as (e,G1,G2,GT , p, a, b, c, g2, X),
we show that there exists a forger Fbasic which can break the basic scheme with
the help of the forger Fencode of the encoded-message signature scheme.
Game0. This is an attack on the original encoded-message signature scheme.
Let S0 denote a successful forging attempt, we have:
Pr[S0] = εencode (1)
by assumption.
Game1. Fbasic selects uniformly random x′ ∈ Z∗p to computes ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
. Fbasic
sets and sends the public key of encoded-message signature scheme as pk =
(e,G1,G2,GT , p, a, ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
, b, c, g2, X) to Fencode. Since the distribution of
the simulated pk is identical to that of the original pk, this gives:
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0]. (2)
Game2. Fbasic simulates the Sign oracle of encoded-message signature scheme
in this game. When Fencode queries mi = (mi,1, . . . ,mi,n) during the i-th query,
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Fbasic queries its basic signature Sign oracle with m′i =
∏n
j=1(x
′+mi,j) and gets
σ′i = (ti, si, vi = (a
m′ibsic)1/(x+ti)) in return. Fbasic gives σ′i as the signature of
mi to Fencode where:
vi = (a
m′ibsic)1/(x+ti)
=
(
a
∏n
j=1(x
′+mi,j)bsic
)1/(x+ti)
as required. As Fencode perfectly simulates the Sign for Fbasic, we have:
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1]. (3)
Challenge. At some point, Fencode decided the messages m∗ = (m∗1, . . . ,m∗n) to
be challenged on. Fbasic then sets m′ =
∏n
j=1(x
′+m∗j ) as his challenge message.
Fencode and Fbasic can continue to interact as in Game2 but we do not repeat it
them here as the probability of a successful forging attempt is the same.
Game3. When Fencode outputs a valid forgery σ∗ = (t∗, s∗, v∗) for the encoded-
message signature scheme on the challenge message m∗ = (m∗1, . . . ,m∗n), Fbasic
outputs σ∗ as the forgery for the basic signature scheme on the message m′ =∏n
j=1(x
′ + m∗j ). Fbasic success in producing a forgery for the basic signature
scheme because σ∗ is also a valid signature on m′:
v∗ =
(
a
∏n
j=1(x
′+m∗j )bs
∗
c
)1/(x+t∗)
= (am
′
bs
∗
c)1/(x+t
∗)
as required. The probability of this successful forgery is then:
Pr[S3] = εbasic. (4)
Summing up the probability from equation (1) to (4), we have εencode = εbasic
and tencode = tbasic as needed. uunionsq
We do not know how to construct the reduction in the opposite direction, i.e.,
from the basic signature scheme to the encoded-message signature scheme with-
out breaking the discrete logarithm assumption of ax
′
. On the other hand, we see
that the reduction exists if the basic signature scheme also encodes its message
such that the signature is having the form σ = (t, s, v = (ax
′+mbsc)1/(x+t)) and
this is exactly the singleton of the encoded-message signature. This shows that
breaking the encoded-message signature scheme is at least as hard as breaking
the basic signature scheme.
It remains to prove that the encoding method is collision resistant. This is
to ensure a collision m∗ cannot be found such that a signature σ is valid on two
different messages m and m∗. When there is only one encoded message m in the
signature, it is impossible to find a collision as shown below:
ax
′+m = ax
′+m∗
∴ x′ +m ≡ x′ +m∗ mod p
m ≡ m∗ mod p
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where there is only one m ∈ Zp for the value ax′+m ∈ G1. For the completeness
of the security analysis, we also consider the case of multiple encoded messages
and prove its collision resistant as follows.
Theorem 3. If the encoding is (tcol, εcol)-collision resistant, then the Strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption is (tsdh, εsdh)-hard.
Proof. We show that if there exists an adversary A which can find a collision
of the encoded messages, there exists a challenger C which can break the SDH
assumption with the help of A. C sets the SDH challenge (a, ax′ , . . . , ax′n) as the
parameters for encoding method and sends to A.
WhenA found a collision {m∗1, . . . ,m∗t′} on some chosen messages {m1, . . . ,mt}
such that a
∏t
i=1(x
′+mi) = a
∏t′
i=1(x
′+m∗i ) where 1 ≤ t, t′ ≤ n, there exists at
least one m∗j /∈ {m1, . . . ,mn} such that a
∏t
i=1(x
′+mi) = ac(x
′)(x′+m∗j )+d where
c(x′), d ∈ Z∗p can be computed from long division. C can extract a solution
(m∗j , a
1
x′+m∗
j ) for the SDH problem as follow:
a
∏t
i=1(x
′+mi) = a
∏t′
i=1(x
′+m∗i )
⇔ac(x′)(x′+m∗j )+d = a
∏t′
i=1(x
′+m∗i )
⇔ac(x
′)+ d
x′+m∗
j = a
∏t′
i=1,i 6=j(x
′+m∗i )
⇔a
1
x′+m∗
j =
(
a
∏t′
i=1,i 6=j(x
′+m∗i )/ac(x
′)
)d−1
.
uunionsq
4.3 Optimization
The optimization on signing described by Boneh and Boyen [9] and Okamoto
[28] still applicable here by viewing the messages as m =
∏n
i=1(x
′ + mi). It
requires the knowledge of the discrete logarithms β−1, γ ∈ Z∗p such that b = aβ
and c = aγ . During signing, the signer selects a random δ ∈ Z∗p to compute:
v =
(
a
∏n
j=1(x
′+m1,j)bsc
) 1
x+t
=
(
a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mi)+sβ+γ
) 1
x+t
=
(
a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mi)+
δ−r0(x′+m0)−r1
∏n
i=1(x
′+mi)−γ
β β+γ
) 1
x+t
= a
δ
x+t
where σ = (t, s = (δ − ∏ni=1(x′ + mi) − γ)β−1, v). This replaces two scalar
multiplications and two point addition in G1 with two subtraction and one mul-
tiplication in Zp in the Sign algorithm.
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On the other hand, optimization on the verification can be done by perform-
ing the verification as e(v,X) = e(
∏n
i=0(a
x′i)αibscv−t, g2) instead. This switches
one scalar multiplication and one point addition from G2 to G1 in the Verify
algorithm. The correctness still hold as shown below:
e(v,X) = e(v, gx+t2 )e(v, g
−t
2 )
= e
(
n∏
i=0
(ax
′i
)αibsc, g2
)
e(v, g−t2 )
= e
(
n∏
i=0
(ax
′i
)αibscv−t, g2
)
.
If the signature is initiated with Type-1 pairing, we can take a step further
to precompute and store (n + 1) + 3 elements {Ai = e(ax′i , g2)}0≤i≤n, B =
e(b, g2), C = e(c, g2) in GT into the public key. This sacrifice allows us to replace
(n+ 1) + 3 scalar multiplications, n+ 3 point additions in G1, with (n+ 1) + 2
exponentiation and n+ 3 additions in GT in the Verify algorithm such that:
e(v,X) = e
(
n∏
i=0
(ax
′i
)αibscv−t, g2
)
=
n∏
i=0
Aαii B
sCe(v−t, g2).
This precomputation is not effective for Type-3 pairing because |GT | = 2|G1|
for Type-1 pairing but |GT | ≥ 6|G1| for Type-3 pairing.
5 Anonymous Credential System
It is clear that the security of SDH-based CL signature is not affected after ap-
plying the encoding mechanism on the messages. Now we are ready to extend it
to a multi-show anonymous credential system as follows.
KeyGen(1k): Construct three cyclic groups G1,G2,GT of order p based on an
elliptic curve whose bilinear pairing is e : G1 × G2 → GT . Select random
generators a, b, c ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and two secret values x, x′ ∈ Z∗p. Compute
the values ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
, X1 = g
x′
2 , . . . , Xn = g
x′n
2 to output the public key
pk = (e,G1,G2,GT , p, a, ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
, b, c, g2, X = g
x
2 , X1, . . . , Xn) and the se-
cret key sk = (x, x′).
(Obtain(pk,A), Issue(pk, sk)): User and verifier interact as follows to generate a
user credential cred on an attribute set A.
1. User chooses random m1, s′, r′ ∈ Z∗p and computes the commitment on the
attributes m1, . . . ,mn as C = ar
′∏n
j=1(x
′+mj)bs
′
= (
∏n
j=0(a
x′j )αj )r
′
bs
′
.
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2. User proves the discrete logarithms representation (s′, r′α0, . . . , r′αn) to signer
as follows:
(a) User randomly selects rs′ , r0, . . . , rn ∈ Z∗p and sends C,R =
∏n
j=0(a
x′j )rj brs′
to issuer.
(b) issuer replies with a challenge e ∈ Z∗p.
(c) User sends the response zs′ = rs′ + es′, z0 = r0 + er′α0, . . . , zn = rn +
er′αn to issuer.
(d) Issuer proceeds to the next step if:
n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zj bzs′ =
n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rj+er
′αj brs′+es
′
=
n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rj brs′
 n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)r
′αj bs
′
e
= RCe
holds. Else, issuer outputs ⊥ and stops.
3. Issuer generates the signature for user as σ = (t, s′′, v = (Cbs
′′
c)1/(x+t)).
4. User outputs the user secret key as usk = m1 and credential as cred =
(t, s, v, r′,m1, . . . ,mn) where:
s = s′ + s′′
v =
(
ar
′∏n
j=1(x
′+mj)bsc
)1/(x+t)
as required.
Remark : The value αn always equal to 1 and so we have zn = rn+ er′. This also
indicates that the prover actually proves the representation of (s′, r′α0, . . . , r′αn−1, r′).
(Prove(pk,A, cred,⊥),Verify(pk,⊥)): The proof of possession protocol proves the
ownership of a credential. This is done by the prover in showing that he owns
a credential cred which contains the attribute set A = {m1, . . . ,mn} without
disclosing any attribute. Recall that the commitment C =
(∏n
j=0 a
x′jαj
)r′
bs,
the Prove and Verify algorithms interact as follows:
1. Prover chooses r, y, rr, ry, rty, r0, . . . , rn, rs ∈ Z∗p and sends v′ = vry
−1
, v′′ =
v′y, V = v′ry , Y =
∏n
j=0(a
x′j )rj brscrrv′rty to verifier.
2. Verifier replies with a random challenge e ∈ Z∗p.
3. Prover responds with zr = rr + er, zy = ry + ey, zty = rty − ety, z0 =
r0 + err
′α0, . . . , zn = rn + err′αn, zs = rs + ers.
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4. Verifier outputs 1 if the equation e(
∏n
j=0(a
x′j )zj bzsczrv′zty , g2) = e(Y, g2)e((v′zy/V ), X)
holds such that:
e(
n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zj bzsczrv′zty , g2) = e
 n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rj+err
′αj brs+erscrr+erv′rty−ety, g2

= e
Y
 n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rr
′αj brscrv−ty
e , g2

= e
(
Y
(((
a
∏n
j=1(x
′+mj)
)r′
bsc
)r
v′−ty
)e
, g2
)
= e(Y, g2)e
(
v(x+t)rv′−ty, ge2
)
= e(Y, g2)e(v
′(x+t)yv′−ty, ge2)
= e(Y, g2)e(v
′xy, ge2)
= e(Y, g2)e(v
′y, Xe)
= e(Y, g2)e((v
′zy/V ), X)
and 0 otherwise.
(Prove(pk,A, cred,A′),Verify(pk,A′)): This is the show proof for AND statement.
It is a variant of the proof of possession protocol where prover discloses an
attribute A′ = mi upon the request from verifier, and proves that his credential
cred containsA′ = mi. In order to do so, prover has to prove that (x′+mi) divides
the encoded attribute set
∏n
j=1(x
′ + mj) in cred such that
∏n
j=1(x
′ + mj) =
(x′ +mi)
∑n−1
j=0 βjx
′j . We can extend this disclosure to multiple attributes such
that A′ = {m1, . . . ,mι} and
∏ι
i=1(x
′+mi) =
∑ι
i=0 δix
′i where
∏n
j=1(x
′+mj) =∑ι
i=0 δix
′i ·∑n−ιj=0 βjx′j . The show proof for the AND statement is as follows:
1. Verifier requests a, AND show proof for the attribute set A′ = {m1, . . . ,mι}.
2. Prover randomly selects r, y, rr, rty, rβ0 , . . . , rβn−ι , rs ∈ Z∗p and sends v′ =
vry
−1
, v′′ = v′y, V = v′ry , Y1 = brrscrrv′rty , Y2 =
∏n−ι
j=0(a
x′j )rβj .
3. Verifier replies with a random challenge e ∈ Z∗p.
4. Prover responds with zr = rr + er, zy = ry + ey, zty = rty − ety, zβ0 =
rβ0 + err
′β0, . . . , zβn−ι = rβn−ι + err
′βn−ι, zs = rs + ers.
5. Verifier outputs 1 if the equation:
e(bzsczrv′zty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zβj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi
 = e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e((v′zy/V ), X)
holds such that:
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e(bzsczrv′zty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zβj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi

= e(brscrrv′rty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rβj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi
e(brscrv′−ty, g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rr
′βj ,
ι−1∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi
e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)
(
e((bs)rcrv′−ty, g2)e
(
arr
′∑n−ι
j=0 x
′jβj , g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2
))e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)
(
e((bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
(
arr
′∏n
j=1(x
′+mj), g2
))e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e((a
∏n
j=1(x
′+mj))r
′
bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e(v(x+t)rv′−ty, g2)e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e(v′(x+t)yv′−ty, ge2)
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e(v′xy, ge2)
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e(v′y, Xe)
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi)e((v′zy/V ), X).
and 0 otherwise.
Remark : The disclosed attributes are known by verifier and thus
∏ι
i=0(g
x′i
2 )
δi ∈
G2 can be calculated by the verifier. If the verifier requests for a show proof on
one attribute only, we can set ι = 1 and run the protocol.
(Prove(pk,A, cred, L),Verify(pk, L)): This is the show proof for OR statement.
Consider the scenario where the prover is given a list of attributes L = {m1, . . . ,ml}
and he needs to prove that he has one mi ∈ L in his cred without the veri-
fier knowing which mi he is proving. Firstly, the prover encodes the attributes
in L such that
∏l
j=1(x
′ + mj) = (x′ + mi)
∑l
j=1,j 6=i β
′
jx
′j . Next, the prover
proves that the same (x′ +mi) divides the encoded attributes in his cred such
that
∏n
j=1(x
′ + mj) = (x′ + mi)
∑n−1
j=0 βjx
′j . We can also extend this proto-
col to prove the possession on multiple attributes {m1, . . . ,mι} ∈ L such that∏ι
j=i(x
′ +mi) =
∑ι
i=0 δix
′i as in the AND statement. The show proof for the
OR statement is as follows:
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1. Verifier sends Z = a
∏l
j=1(x
′+mj) =
∏l
j=0(a
x′j )αj and requests an OR show
proof for ι-many attributes from L = {m1, . . . ,ml}.
2. Prover randomly selects r, y, rr, rr′ , rrr′ , rty, rδ1 , . . . , rδι , rβ′0 . . . , rβ′l−ι , rβ0 , . . . , rβn−ι , rs ∈
Z∗p and sends v′ = vry
−1
, v′′ = v′y, V = v′ry , Y1 = brrscrrv′rty , Y2 =
∏n−ι
j=0(a
x′j )rβj , Y3 =∏ι
i=0(g
x′i
2 )
rr′ , Z1 = Z
rrr′ , Z2 =
∏l−1
j=0(a
x′j )
rβ′
j .
3. Verifier replies with a random challenge e ∈ Z∗p.
4. Prover responds with zr = rr + er, zy = ry + ey, zr′ = rr′ + er′, zrr′ =
rrr′ + err
′, zty = rty − ety, zδ0 = rδ0 + er′δ0, . . . , zδι = rδι + er′δι, zβ0 =
rβ0 + erβ0, . . . , zβn−ι = rβn−ι + erβn−ι, zβ′0 = rβ′0 + erβ
′
0, . . . , zβ′l−ι = rβ′l−ι +
erβ′l−ι, zs = rs + ers.
5. Verifier outputs 1 if the two equations hold:
(a) e(bzsczrv′zty , g2)e
(∏n−1
j=0 (a
x′j )zβj ,
∏ι
i=0(g
x′i
2 )
zr′
)
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)e((v
′zy/V ), X)
(b) e
(∏l−ι
j=0(a
x′j )
zβ′
j ,
∏ι
i=0(g
x′i
2 )
zr′
)
= e(Z2, Y3)e ((Z
zrr′/Z1), g2)
such that the correctness of the first equation is:
e(bzsczrv′zty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zβj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
zr′

= e(brscrrv′rty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rβj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
rr′
e(brscrv′−ty, g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rβj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
r′δi
e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)
(
e((bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
(
a
r
∑n−1
j=0 x
′jβj
1 , g
r′
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2
))e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)
(
e((bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
(
arr
′∏n
j=1(x
′+mj), g2
))e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)e((a
∏n
j=1(x
′+mj))r
′
bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)e(v
(x+t)rv′−ty, g2)e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)e(v
′′, Xe)
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, Y3)e((v
′zy/V ), X)
while the correctness of the second equation is:
e
 l−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)
zβ′
j ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
zr′
 = e
 l−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)
rβ′
j ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
r′
 e
 l−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rβ
′
j ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
r′δi
e
= e(Z2, Y3)e
(
ar
∑l−ι
j=0 x
′jβ′j , g
r′
∑ι
i=0 x
′jδi
2
)e
= e(Z2, Y3)e
(
Zrr
′
, g2
)e
= e(Z2, Y3)e ((Z
zrr′/Z1), g2)
and verifier outputs 0 otherwise.
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Remark : If the verifier requests for a show proof on one attribute only, we can
set ι = 1 and run the protocol.
(Prove(pk,A, cred,A′),Verify(pk,A′)): This is the show proof for NOT statement.
In order to show that an attribute A′ = mi is not in the encoded-message
signature, we use the fact that when (x′ + mi) -
∏n
j=1(x
′ + mj), there exist
a unique polynomial
∏n−1
j=1,j 6=i(x
′ + mj) =
∑n−1
j=0 ωjx
′j such that
∏n
j=1(x
′ +
mj) = (x
′ +mi)
∑n−1
j=0 ωjx
′j + d where ωj , d ∈ Zp. Note that ωj and d can be
computed using long division and d 6= 1 is always the case when (x′ + mi) -∏n
j=1(x
′ + mj). We can also extend this protocol to prove the possession on
multiple attributes A′ = {m1, . . . ,mι} such that
∏ι
j=i(x
′ +mi) =
∑ι
i=0 δix
′i as
in the AND statement. The show proof on the NOT statement is as below:
1. Verifier request a NOT show proof for the attributes A′ = {m1, . . . ,mι}.
2. Prover randomly selects r, y, rr, rrr′ , rty, rω0 , . . . , rωn−ι , rd, rs ∈ Z∗p and sends
v′ = vry
−1
, v′′ = v′y, V = v′ry , Y1 = ardbrrscrrv′rty , Y2 =
∏n−ι
j=0(a
x′j )rωj .
3. Verifier replies with a random challenge e ∈ Z∗p.
4. Prover responds with zr = rr+er, zy = ry+ey, zrr′ = rrr′+err′, zty = rty−
ety, zω0 = rω0 + err
′ω0, . . . , zωn−ι = rωn−ι + err
′ωn−ι, zd = rd + err′d, zs =
rs + ers.
5. Verifier accepts if the equation
e(azdbzsczrv′zty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zωj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi
 = e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g∑ιi=0 x′iδi2 )e((v′zy/V ), X)
holds such that:
e(azdbzsczrv′zty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zωj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi

= e(ardbrscrrv′rty , g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rωj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi
 ·
e(arr′dbrscrv′−ty, g2)e
n−ι∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)rr
′ωj ,
ι∏
i=0
(gx
′i
2 )
δi
e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2 )
(
e(adr
′
bs)rcrv′−ty, g2)e
(
arr
′∑n−ι
j=0 x
′jωj , g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2
))e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2 )
(
e((adr
′
bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
(
arr
′∏n
j=1(x
′+mj)−d, g2
))e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2 )e((a
∏n
j=1(x
′+mj))r
′
bsc)rv′−ty, g2)e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2 )e(v
(x+t)rrv′−ty, g2)e
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2 )e(v
′′, Xe)
= e(Y1, g2)e(Y2, g
∑ι
i=0 x
′iδi
2 )e((v
′zy/V ), X).
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Remark : If the attributes should not be disclosed, we can run the protocol as in
OR statement where each δi is masked by r′ while each ωj is masked by r. If the
verifier requests for a show proof on one attribute only, we can set ι = 1 and run
the protocol.
5.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed anonymous credential sys-
tem. From the first glance, it seems that the seuf-cma security from the encoded-
message signature is sufficient to ensure the security against impersonation of the
ABC system. However, the opposite is not true where a successful impersonation
of the ABC system does not necessarily yield a forgery of the encoded-message
signature. It can be that the proof of possession protocol is not properly con-
structed. Moreover, even if we assume the adversary impersonates successfully
by forging a credential, the credential contains the signature on a set of attributes
A which is now a group element in G1 but not the exponents in Z∗p as in the
encoded-message signature scheme.
Table 1. Types of impersonation and the corresponding assumptions.
Type A s t v Adversary Assumption
1 0 0 0 0 A1 SDH
2 0 0 0 1 A1 DLOG
3 0 0 1 0 A2 SDH
4 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A
5 0 1 0 0 A1 SDH
6 0 1 0 1 A1 DLOG
7 0 1 1 0 A3 SDH
8 0 1 1 1 N/A N/A
9 1 0 0 0 A1 SDH
10 1 0 0 1 A1 DLOG
11 1 0 1 0 A2 SDH
12 1 0 1 1 N/A N/A
13 1 1 0 0 A1 SDH
14 1 1 0 1 A1 DLOG
15 1 1 1 0 A3 SDH
Note: 1 = equal, 0 = unequal, N/A = not available
Therefore, we give a direct proof for the ABC system by reducing its secu-
rity against impersonation to the hardness of SDH assumption. As an adversary
impersonates by either forges a credential or breaks the proof of possession pro-
tocol in the ABC system, we categorize the way an adversary impersonates by
the types of forgeries on the credential as shown in Table 1. The bit 1 indicates
the forged credential element appears in an output of the Obtain oracle, while
0 indicates the credential element does not appear before. Subsequently, based
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on the forgery types, we differentiate the adversary A into A = {A1,A2,A3}
corresponding to three different simulation strategies by the SDH challenger C.
The N/A cases need further explanation. Let M∗ =
∏n
j=1(x
′ + m∗j ) and
Mi =
∏n
j=1(x
′ + mi,j), if the forgery (v∗, t∗) produced by A equals to a pair
(vi, ti) which has been generated by C, we have forgeries of Type 4, 8, 12 such
that:
∵ v∗ ≡ vi
(aM
∗
bs
∗
c)
1
x+t∗ ≡ (aMibsic) 1x+t∗
(aM
∗+s∗β+γ)
1
x+t∗ ≡ (aMi+siβ+γ) 1x+t∗
∴ M
∗ + s∗β + γ
x+ t∗
≡ Mi + siβ + γ
x+ t∗
mod p
(x+ t∗)(M∗ + s∗β + γ) ≡ (x+ t∗)(Mi + siβ + γ) mod p
x(M∗ −Mi + β(s∗ − si)) ≡ t∗(Mi −M∗ + β(si − s∗) + γ − γ) mod p
x ≡ t
∗(Mi −M∗ + β(si − s∗))
M∗ −Mi + β(s− si) mod p
x ≡ −t
∗((M∗ −Mi) + β(s∗ − si))
M∗ −Mi + β(s∗ − si) mod p
x ≡ −t∗ ≡ ti mod p
and C can break the SDH assumption using x. Notice that this calculation holds
as well whenM∗ =Mi or s∗ = si. In order to simplify C’ simulation strategy, we
design the challenger C to avoid these three forgeries such that it checks whether
X = g−ti2 every time after selecting a random ti. On the other hand, Type 16
forgery will not occur by definition as it is not a forgery but a credential obtained
by A previously from its Obtain oracle. We describe Lemma 1, 2 and 3 which
correspond to adversary A1,A2 and A3 as follows.
Lemma 1. If an adversary A1 (timp, εimp)-breaks the anonymous credential sys-
tem, then there exists an algorithm C which (tsdh, εsdh)-breaks the SDH assump-
tion such that:
εimp ≤ √εsdh + qo↔i + (qo↔i + 1)/2−p,
timp ≤ 2tsdh + (2n−1 − n− 2)tmul + 2tsmul + tadd
where qo↔i is the total query made to the Obtain oracle for n attributes, while
tmul, tsmul, tadd are the time required for a multiplication in Z∗p and a scalar mul-
tiplication and an addition in G1.
Proof. Given a SDH instance (g1, gx1 , gx
2
1 , . . . , g
xq
1 , g2, g
x
2 ) where q = qo↔i + qp↔v
is the total query A1 can issue to the Obtain and Verify oracles, we show that
if A1 exists, there exists an algorithm C which can output (g
1
x+t
1 , t) by acting as
the simulator for the ABC system as follows:
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Game0. This is the attack by A on the real anonymous credential system. Let
S be the event of a successful impersonation, by assumption, we have:
Pr[S0] = εimp (5)
Game1. In order to simulate the environment of the ABC system, C uniformly
random selects t0, t′0, t′′0 , x′, t1, . . . , tq ∈ Zp and checks whether X = g−ti2 for
i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. If such ti is found, C outputs the solution of SDH using the discrete
logarithm x = −ti. Else, let f(x) denotes the polynomial f(x) =
∏q
k=1(x +
tk) =
∑q
k=0 θkx
k and fi(x) denotes the polynomial fi(x) =
∏q
k=1,k 6=i(x+ tk) =∑q−1
k=0 λkx
k where θ0, . . . , θq ∈ Z∗p and λ0, . . . , λq ∈ Z∗p can be found in 2q− q− 1
and 2q−1 − q− 2 multiplications in Z∗p, respectively. Let gf(x)1 =
∏q
k=0(g
xk
1 )
θk , C
sends (e,G1,G2,GT , p, a = gf(x)t01 , ax
′
, . . . , ax
′n
, b = g
f(x)t′0
1 , c = g
f(x)t′′0
1 , g2, X =
gx2 , X1, . . . , Xn) as the public key to A1. C also create two empty lists Qo↔i and
Qp↔v where the former stores the corrupted credentials simulated during the
issuing protocol while the latter stores the non-corrupted credentials simulated
during the proof of possession protocol. Since t0, t′0, t′′0 are uniformly random,
the distribution of the public key is the same as in the original scheme due to
the self-reducibility of SDH parameters [9] and we have:
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] (6)
Game2. In this game, A1 plays the role of user while C plays the role of is-
suer in the issuing protocol. C simulates the Issue oracle which interacts with
A1 to produce a credential credi for A1’s chosen hidden attribute set Ai =
{mi,1, . . . ,mi,n}. Their interaction is as follows:
1. A1 runs the issuing protocol with C as follows:
(a) A1 sends the commitment Ci of the hidden attribute set Ai and the
corresponding witness Ri to Ci.
(b) C replies with a challenge ei ∈ Z∗p.
(c) A1 returns the response corresponding to the commitment and witness
zi,s′ , zi,0, . . . , zi,n to C.
(d) If
∏n
j=0(a
x′j )zi,j bzi,s′ = RiC
ei
i holds, C resets A1 to where it just sent
Ci, Ri. If A1 passes the check again, C obtains two transcripts {Ci, Ri,
(ei,1, zi,s′,1, zi,0,1, . . . , zi,n,1), (ei,2, zi,s′,2, zi,0,2, . . . , zi,n,2)}. Subsequently,
C can extract the secret exponents used in constructing the witness and
commitment. If at either round the check fails, C outputs ⊥.
2. C chooses a random value s′′i ∈ Z∗p and sets vi = (
∏n
j=0 a
αi,jx
′j
i )
r′ib
s′i+s
′′
i
i ci
where ai = g
fi(x)t0
1 , bi = g
fi(x)t
′
0
1 , ci = g
fi(x)t
′′
0
1 . If (αi,0, . . . , αi,n) ∈ Qp↔v, C
removes it fromQp↔v. C adds (αi,0, . . . , αi,n, ti, si, vi, r′i) toQo↔i and returns
(ti, s
′′
i , vi) to A1 as the encoded-message signature on Ci. The simulated
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signature is valid because:
e(vi, Xg
ti
2 ) = e((a
∏n
j=1(x
′+mi,j)
i )
r′ib
s′i+s
′′
i
i ci, g
x+ti
2 )
= e(((ar
′
i
∏n
j=1(x
′+mi,j)b
s′i+s
′′
i
i ci)
1
x+ti , gx+ti2 )
= e(ar
′
i
∏n
j=1(x
′+mi,j)bs
′
i+s
′′
i c, g2)
= e(Cib
s′′i c, g2)
as required.
Since C simulates the Issue oracle perfectly, A1 can formulate its credential
cred = (ti, si = s
′
i + s
′′
i , vi, r
′
i, uski, Ai) as in the original issuing protocol.
By Theorem 3, the encoding is collision resistant and so the extracted values
αi,0, . . . , αi,n from the reset must be the Ai used by A1 throughout the issuing
protocol. Next, since A1 knows the secret exponents Ai, C always reset success-
fully. Let qo↔i be the total rounds of successful issuing protocol initiated by A1,
by Reset Lemma [8], we have:
Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[S1] + qo↔i(1 + 2−p) (7)
Game3. In this game, A1 plays the role of prover while C plays the role of
verifier in the proof of possession protocol. C simulates the Verify oracle which
communicates with A1 to confirm the possession on credi for Ai:
1. A1 sends the witnesses v′i, v′′i , C ′i, R′i, Vi, Yi to C.
2. C replies with a random challenge ei ∈ Z∗p.
3. A1 responds with zi,r, zi,y, zi,ty, zi,0, . . . , zi,n, zi,s.
4. Verifier accepts if the following equation holds:
e(
n∏
j=0
(ax
′j
)zi,j bzi,sczi,rv′zi,ty , g2) = e(Yi, g2)e((v′i
zi,y/Vi), X)
and outputs ⊥ otherwise.
If this is a show proof for the AND, OR or NOT statement, C decides a random
disclosure attribute set A′i before the protocol starts. The verification at step 4 is
then changed accordingly, corresponding to the logical statements being proved.
C simulates the Verify oracle correctly and this gives:
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] (8)
Game4. In this game, A1 plays the role of verifier while C is required to simulate
the Prove oracle. If A1 asks for proof of possession protocol, C interacts with A1
using a credi which contains a random attribute set Ai. Else if A1 asks for a
show proof for the AND, OR or NOT statement on a disclosure attribute set A′i, C
interacts with A1 using a credi which contains A′i. Without loss of generality, we
assume C already has the appropriate credentials on his hand for these purposes.
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Else, C simulates (αi,0, . . . , αi,n, ti, si, vi, r′i) and adds it to Qp↔v before doing
what A1 did in Game3. This gives:
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3] (9)
Challenge: A1 decided to announce the challenge attribute set A∗ 6⊆ Qo↔i. A1
is still allowed to query the oracles as in Game2, Game3 and Game4 but with
the restriction A∗ 6⊆ Qo↔i in Game2. Since the success probability does not
change, we do not reiterate the games involved.
Game5. Finally, if A1 completes a successful proof of possession or show proof
for an unknown cred∗ ofA∗ = {m∗1, . . . ,m∗n} 6⊆ Qo↔i such that (A1(pk,A∗, cred∗, ·), C(pk, ·)) =
1, C resetsA1 to the time where it has just sent the witnesses. If (A1(pk,A∗, ·, ·), C(pk, ·)) =
1 again the second time, C can obtain two valid transcripts (v′∗, v′′∗, C ′∗, R′∗, V ∗, Y ∗,
(e1, z
∗
r,1, z
∗
y,1, z
∗
ty,1, z
∗
0,1, . . . , z
∗
n,1, z
∗
s,1), (e2, z
∗
r,2, z
∗
y,2, z
∗
ty,2, z
∗
0,2, . . . , z
∗
n,2, z
∗
s,2)) and re-
cover the following:
1. r∗ = z
∗
r,2−z∗r,1
e2−e1
2. y∗ = z
∗
y,2−z∗y,1
e2−e1
3. r∗r′∗ = α∗n =
z∗n,2−z∗n,1
e2−e1
4. α∗0 =
z∗0,2−z∗0,1
(e2−e1)rr′ , . . . , α
∗
n−1 =
z∗n−1,2−z∗n−1,1
(e2−e1)r∗r′∗
5. s∗ = z
∗
s,2−z∗s,1
(e2−e1)r
6. t∗ = z
∗
ty,2−z∗ty,1
(e2−e1)y
7. v∗ = v′′∗r
∗−1
to extract the elements (t∗, s∗, v∗) from cred∗. Since A1 must output t∗ /∈
{t1, . . . , tq}, if v∗ /∈ Qo↔i∪Qp↔v, C can construct a polynomial c(x) =
∑n−1
k=0 ωix
i
of degree n− 1 such that f(x) = c(x)(x+ t) + d where ωi, d ∈ Z∗p to calculate:
v∗
1
(t0
∑n
i=0
α∗
i
x′i+t′0s∗+t′′0 )d g
− c(x)d
1 = g
(t0
∑n
i=0 α
∗
i x
′i+t′0s∗+t′′0 )f(x)
(t0
∑n
i=0
α∗
i
x′i+t′0s∗+t′′0 )(x+t∗)d
− c(x)d
1
= g
c(x)(x+t∗)+d
d(x+t∗) −
c(x)
d
1
= g
1
x+t∗
1
and output (g
1
x+t∗ , t∗) as the solution for the SDH instance.
On the other hand, if we have v∗ ∈ Qo↔i∪Qp↔v, it implies (t0
∑n
i=0 α
∗
i x
′i+t′0s
∗+t′′0 )f(x)
x+t∗ ≡
(t0
∑n
i=0 αj,ix
′i+t′0sj+t
′′
0 )f(x)
x+tj
mod p for a j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Let T ∗ and Tj be the nu-
merator (excluding f(x)) for the two fractions, respectively, C can extract the
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discrete logarithm x such that:
T ∗f(x)
x+ t∗
≡ Tif(x)
x+ tj
mod p
T ∗
x+ t∗
≡ Tj
x+ tj
mod p
T ∗(x+ tj) ≡ Tj(x+ t∗) mod p
T ∗x+ T ∗tj ≡ Tjx+ Tjt∗ mod p
x(T ∗ − Tj) ≡ Tjt∗ − T ∗tj mod p
x ≡ Tjt
∗ − T ∗tj
T ∗ − Tj mod p
to solve the SDH instance. Notice that x can be found even when we have
s∗ ∈ Qo↔i ∪ Qp↔v for the same j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Furthermore, C will not get
denominator T ∗− Tj = 0 as this is the Type 8 forgery in Table 1. Therefore, we
have:
Pr[S5] ≤ Pr[S4] +√εsdh + 2−p (10)
and summing up the probability from (5) to (10), we have εimp ≤ √εsdh+qo↔i+
(qo↔i + 1)/2−p as required. The time taken by C is at most 2tsdh due to reset,
besides the final SDH solution extraction which costs 2n−1−n−2 multiplications
in Z∗p plus two scalar multiplications and one addition in G1. uunionsq
Lemma 2. If an adversary A2 (timp, εimp)-breaks the anonymous credential sys-
tem, then there exists an algorithm C which (tsdh, εsdh)-breaks the SDH assump-
tion such that:
εimp ≤ √εsdh + qo↔i + (qo↔i + 1)/2−p,
timp ≤ 2tsdh + (2n−2 − n− 3)tmul + (qo↔i + qp↔v + 1)tsmul + tadd
where qo↔i, qp↔v are the total query made to the Obtain and Verify oracles for n
attributes, respectively, while tmul, tsmul, tadd are the time required for a multipli-
cation in Z∗p and a scalar multiplication and an addition in G1.
Proof. Given a SDH instance (g1, gx1 , gx
2
1 , . . . , g
xq
1 , g2, g
x
2 ) where q = qo↔i + qp↔v
is the total query A1 can issue to the Obtain and Verify oracles, there exists an
algorithm C which can output (g
1
x+t
1 , t) by acting as the simulator for the ABC
system as follows:
Game0. This is the same as the Game0 in Lemma 1 where we have:
Pr[S0] = εimp (11)
Game1. This is the same as the Game1 in Lemma 1 except that C addition-
ally computes fi,j(x) =
∏q
k=1,k 6=i,j(x+ tk) =
∑q−2
k=0 γkx
k where γ0, . . . , γq−2 can
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be found with 2q−2 − q − 3 multiplications in Z∗p. C sends (e,G1,G2,GT , p, a =
g
f(x)t0
1 , a
x′ , . . . , ax
′n
, b = g
f(x)t′0−
∑q
i=1 fi(x)
1 , c = g
f(x)t′′0+
∑q
i=1 sifi(x)
1 , g2, X = g
x
2 , X1, . . . , Xn)
as the public key to A2 where s1, . . . , sq ∈ Z∗p are uniformly random integers.
This gives:
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] (12)
Game2. This is the same as the Game2 in Lemma 1 except that, after resetting
A2, C simulates the encoded-message signature (tj , sj , vj) on Cj = (a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i))r
′
j bs
′
j
for Aj = {mj,1, . . . ,mj,n} such that:
vj = ((a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i))r
′
j bs
′
j+(sj−s′j)c)1/(x+tj)
= ((g
f(x)t0
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)
1 )
r′jg
sj(f(x)t
′
0−
∑q
i=1 fi(x))
1 g
f(x)t′′0+
∑q
i=1 sifi(x)
1 )
1/(x+tj)
= (g
f(x)(r′jt0
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)+sjt′0+t
′′
0 )−sj
∑q
i=1 fi(x)+
∑q
i=1 sifi(x)
1 )
1/(x+tj)
= g
fj(x)(r
′
jt0
∏n
k=1(x
′+mj,i)+sjt′0+t
′′
0 )−sj
∑q
i=1,i 6=j fi,j(x)+
∑q
i=1,i 6=j sifi,j(x)
1 g
fj(x)(sj−sj)
(x+tj)
1
= g
fj(x)(r
′
jt0
∏n
i=1(x
′+mk,i)+sjt′0+t
′′
0 )+
∑q
i=1,i 6=j(si−sj)fi,j(x)
1
and s′′j = sj − s′j . When the protocol ends, A2 can compile the credential as
credj = (tj , sj = s
′
j + s
′′
j , vj , r
′
j , uskj , Aj). As C simulates the Issue oracle per-
fectly, by Reset Lemma [8], we have:
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1] + qo↔i(1 + 2−p) (13)
Game3. This is the same as the Game3 in Lemma 1 and we have:
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] (14)
Game4. This is the same as the Game4 in Lemma 1 and we have:
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3] (15)
Challenge: A2 decided to announce the challenge attribute set A∗ 6⊆ Qo↔i. A2
is still allowed to query the oracles as in Game2, Game3 and Game4 but with
the restriction A∗ 6⊆ Qo↔i in Game2. Since the success probability does not
change, we do not reiterate the games involved.
Game5. Similar to the Game5 in Lemma 1, C can reset A2 to extract the
elements (t∗, s∗, v∗) of cred∗. Since A2 must output t∗ ∈ Qo↔i ∪ Qp↔v but
s∗ /∈ Qo↔i∪Qp↔v for a j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, C proceeds to compute c(x) of degree n−2
and d ∈ Z∗p from the knowledge of {t1, . . . , tq} such that fj(x) = c(x)(x+ tj)+d.
Recall that C will further have the case v /∈ Qo↔i ∪ Qp↔v or C already found
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x = −tj during Game1. Subsequently, C calculates:(
v/g
fj(x)(r
′∗t0
∏n
i=1(x
′+m∗i )+s
∗t′0+t
′′
0 )+
∑q
i=1,i 6=j(si−s∗)fi,j(x)
1
) 1
d(sj−s∗)
g
− c(x)d
1
= g
fj(x)(sj−s∗)
d(sj−s∗)
1 g
− c(x)d
1
= g
fj(x)
d
1 g
− c(x)d
1
= g
c(x)(x+tj)+d
d(x+tj)
1 g
− c(x)d
1
= g
c(x)
d +
1
x+tj
− c(x)d
1
= g
1
x+tj
1
and outputs (g
1
x+tj
1 , tj) as the solution for the SDH instance. Therefore, we have:
Pr[S5] ≤ Pr[S4] +√εsdh + 2−p (16)
and summing up the probability from (12) to (16), we have εimp ≤ √εsdh+qo↔i+
(qo↔i + 1)/2−p as required. The time taken by C is at most 2tsdh due to reset,
besides the final SDH solution extraction which costs 2n−2−n−3 multiplications
in Z∗p plus q + 1 scalar multiplications and one addition in G1. uunionsq
Lemma 3. If an adversary A3 (timp, εimp)-breaks the anonymous credential sys-
tem, then there exists an algorithm C which (tsdh, εsdh)-breaks the SDH assump-
tion such that:
εimp ≤ √εsdh + qo↔i + (qo↔i + 1)/2−p,
timp ≤ 2tsdh + (2n−2 − n− 3)tmul + (qo↔i + qp↔v + 1)tsmul + tadd
where qo↔i, qp↔v are the total query made to the Obtain and Verify oracles for n
attributes, respectively, while tmul, tsmul, tadd are the time required for a multipli-
cation in Z∗p and a scalar multiplication and an addition in G1.
Proof. Given a SDH instance (g1, gx1 , gx
2
1 , . . . , g
xq
1 , g2, g
x
2 ) where q = qo↔i + qp↔v
is the total query A1 can make to the Obtain and Verify oracles, there exists an
algorithm C which can output (g
1
x+t
1 , t) by acting as the simulator for the ABC
system as follows:
Game0. This is the same as the Game0 in Lemma 1 and we have:
Pr[S0] = εimp (17)
Game1. The precomputations are the same as the Game1 in Lemma 2 but
(e,G1,G2,GT , p, a = g
f(x)t0−
∑qs
i=1 fi(x)
1 , a
x′ , . . . , ax
′n
, b = g
f(x)t′0−
∑qs
i=1 fi(x)
1 , c =
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g
f(x)t′′0+
∑qs
i=1 zifi(x)
1 , g2, X = g
x
2 , X1, . . . , Xn) as the public key toA3 where z1, . . . , zqs ∈
Z∗p. This gives:
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] (18)
Game2. This is the same as the Game2 in Lemma 1 except that, after resetting
A2, C simulates the encoded-message signature (tj , sj , vj) on Cj = (a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i))r
′
j bs
′
j
for Aj = {mj,1, . . . ,mj,n} by letting sj = zj − r′j
∏n
i=1(x
′ +mj,i) where:
vj = ((a
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i))r
′
j bs
′
j+(zj−r′j
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)−s′j)c)1/(x+tj)
= ((g
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)(f(x)t0−
∑q
i=1 fi(x))
1 )
r′jg
sj(f(x)t
′
0−
∑q
i=1 fi(x))
1 g
f(x)t′′0+
∑q
i=1 zifi(x)
1 )
1/(x+tj)
= (g
f(x)(r′jt0
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)+sjt′0+t
′′
0 )−zj
∑q
i=1 fi(x)+
∑q
i=1 zifi(x)
1 )
1/(x+tj)
= g
fj(x)(r
′t0
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)+sjt′0+t
′′
0 )−zj
∑q
i=1,i 6=j fi,j(x)+
∑q
i=1,i 6=j zifi,j(x)
1 g
fj(x)(zj−zj)
x+tj
1
= g
fj(x)(r
′
jt0
∏n
i=1(x
′+mj,i)+sjt′0+t
′′
0 )+
∑q
i=1,i 6=j(zi−zj)fi,j(x)
1
and s′′j = sj−s′j . When the protocol ends, A2 compiles the credential as credj =
(tj , sj = s
′
j + s
′′
j , vj , r
′
j , uskj , Aj). As C simulates the Issue oracle perfectly, by
Reset Lemma [8], we have:
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1] + qo↔i(1 + 2−p) (19)
Game3. This is the same as the Game3 in Lemma 1 and we have:
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] (20)
Game4. This is the same as the Game4 in Lemma 1 and we have:
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3] (21)
Challenge: A2 decided to announce the challenge attribute set A∗ 6⊆ Qo↔i.
A2 is still allowed to query the oracles as in Game2, Game3 and Game4 but
with the exception A∗ 6⊆ Qo↔i in Game2. Since the success probability does
not change, we do not reiterate the games involved.
Game5. Similar to the Game5 in Lemma 1, F can reset A2 to extract the
elements (t∗, s∗, v∗) of cred∗. Since A2 must output t∗, s∗ ∈ Qo↔i ∪ Qp↔v for
a j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, C proceeds to compute c(x) of degree n − 2 and d ∈ Z∗p from
the knowledge of {t1, . . . , tq} such that fj(x) = c(x)(x + tj) + d. Recall that C
will further have the case v /∈ Qo↔i ∪Qp↔v or C already found x = −tj during
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Game1. Subsequently, C calculates:(
v∗/g
fj(x)(r
′∗t0
∏n
i=1(x
′+m∗i )+s
∗t′0+t
′′
0 )+
∑q
i=1,i 6=j(zi−z∗)fi,j(x)
1
) 1
d(zj−z∗)
g
− c(x)d
1
= g
fj(x)(zj−z∗)
d(zj−z∗)
1 g
− c(x)d
1
= g
fj(x)
d
1 g
− c(x)d
1
= g
c(x)(x+tj)+d
d(x+tj)
1 g
− c(x)d
1
= g
c(x)
d +
1
x+tj
− c(x)d
1
= g
1
x+tj
1
and outputs (g
1
x+tj
1 , tj) as the solution for the SDH instance. Therefore, we have:
Pr[S5] ≤ Pr[S4] +√εsdh + 2−p (22)
and summing up the probability from (17) to (22), we have εimp ≤ √εsdh+qo↔i+
(qo↔i + 1)/2−p as required. The time taken by C is at most 2tsdh due to reset,
besides the final SDH solution extraction which costs 2n−2−n−3 multiplications
in Z∗p plus q + 1 scalar multiplications and one addition in G1. uunionsq
Combining Lemma 1, 2, 3 gives us the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If an adversary A (timp, εimp)-breaks the anonymous credential sys-
tem, then there exists an algorithm C which (tsdh, εsdh)-breaks the SDH assump-
tion such that:
εimp ≤ 3(√εsdh + qo↔i + (qo↔i + 1)/2−p),
timp ≤ 3 (2tsdh + tadd) + (2n − 3n− 8)tmul + (2(qo↔i + qp↔v) + 4)tsmul
where qo↔i, qp↔v are the total query made to the Obtain and Verify oracles for n
attributes, respectively, while tmul, tsmul, tadd are the time required for a multipli-
cation in Z∗p and a scalar multiplication and an addition in G1.
From the proof of Theorem 4, it is clear that the issuing and proof of posses-
sion protocols are zero-knowledge protocols, or the reset lemma would fail. Given
the fact that a zero-knowledge protocol also possesses witness indistinguishabil-
ity (WI) [23], it is sufficient to show that the proof of possession protocols are
witness indistinguishable in order to prove the anonymity of the ABC system.
The WI property implies the adversary A has only negligible probability in mak-
ing a correct guess on the identity of the prover, even given access to the Obtain
and Issue oracles in the issuing protocol, as well as the Prove and Verify oracles
in the proof of possession protocol.
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Theorem 5. If an adversary A (tano, εano)-breaks the anonymous credential sys-
tem, then there exists an algorithm C which (twi, εwi)-breaks the witness indistin-
guishability of either the proof of possession protocol or the show proof such that:
εano = εwi, tano = twi
Proof. Given aWI instance (pk, sk) for the prove system (P = Prove, V = Verify)
in the proof of possession protocol, we show that if A exists, there exists an al-
gorithm C which can break the witness indistinguishability of (P, V ) with the
help of A.
Game0. This is the attack by A on the real anonymous credential system. Let
S be the event of a successful distinguishing, by assumption, we have:
Pr[S0] = εano (23)
Game1. In this game, C gives (pk, sk) to A so that the latter can play the role of
user and issuer. When A acts as issuer to interact with C to produce a credential
credi for C’s chosen hidden attribute set Ai = {mi,1, . . . ,mi,n}. Their interaction
is as follows:
1. C runs the issuing protocol as an honest user ui with A as follows:
(a) C randomly selects ri,s′ , ri,0, . . . , ri,n ∈ Z∗p and sends the witness Ci, Ri =∏n
j=0(a
x′j )ri,j bri,s′ to A.
(b) A replies with a challenge ei ∈ Z∗p.
(c) C returns the response corresponding to the commitment and witness
zi,s′ = ri,s′ + eis
′
i, zi,0 = ri,0 + eir
′
i,0αi,0, . . . , zi,n = ri,n + eir
′
i,nαi,n to C.
(d) A proceeds to next step if ∏nj=0(ax′j )zi,j bzi,s′ = RiCeii holds. Else, A
outputs ⊥ and stops.
2. A returns (ti, s′′i , vi) to C as the encoded-message signature on Ci.
Notice that for any two representations (s′1, r′1α0, . . . , r′1αn−1), (s′2, r′2α0, . . . , r′2αn−1)
in the issuing protocol, the distribution of their transcripts are identical to each
other from the view of A. This is true even for the non-uniformly distributed
attributes α0, . . . , αn−1 as they have been randomized by r′. To be precise, the
witness (C,R) sent by C in the first step is independent of the representation
being used while the response (zs′ , z0, . . . , zn−1) sent by C in the third step is
conditioned on the uniformly distributed witness and the challenge value e se-
lected by A. If C is using the first representation, the response are distributed
uniformly over the representations of (C1, R1) and then uniformly distributed
over the representation of R1Ce11 . If the second representation is used, the re-
sponse from C also distributed uniformly over the representation of R2Ce22 as
required where the distribution of response value is uniformly random even if
e1 = e2. We do not describe A’s actions as user because that does not affect
the distribution of the representations chosen by a C in the issuing protocol.
Therefore, we have:
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] (24)
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Game2. In this game, A acts as verifier to interact with C to run proof of
possession protocol on credi for attribute set Ai = {mi,1, . . . ,mi,n}. A can also
request to run show proof on on credi for the AND, OR and NOT statements
on a disclosure attribute set A′i. C interacts as an honest prover ui with A as
follows:
1. C chooses ri, yi, ri,r, ri,y, ri,ty, ri,0, . . . , ri,n, ri,s ∈ Z∗p and sends the witness
v′i = v
riy
−1
i , v′′i = v
′yi
i , Vi = v
′ri,y
i , Yi =
∏n
j=0(a
x′j )ri,j bri,scri,rv′ri,ty to A.
2. A replies with a random challenge ei ∈ Z∗p.
3. C responds with zi,r = ri,r+eiri, zi,y = ri,y+eiyi, zi,ty = ri,ty−eitiyi, zi,0 =
ri,0 + eirir
′
iαi,0, . . . , zi,n = ri,n + eirir
′
iαi,n, zi,s = ri,s + eirisi.
4. A outputs 1 if the equation e(∏nj=0(ax′j )zi,j bzi,sczi,rv′zi,tyi , g2) = e(Yi, g2)e((v′zi,yi /Vi), X)
holds and 0 otherwise.
The proof of possession protocol is an extension to the issuing protocol where
C proves the additional representation (t, s, r′) in the credential. Specifically, C
proves the representation which consists of the randomized representation from
the previous issuing protocol (rs, rr′α0, . . . , rr′αn), the blinded credential ele-
ments (t′ = ty, s = rs) and the blinding factors (r, y). Therefore, for any two rep-
resentations (r1, y1, ty1, r1s, r1r′, r1s, r1r′α0, . . . , r1r′αn), (r2, y2, ty2, r2s, r2r′, r2s,
r2r
′α0, . . . , r2r′αn) in the proof of possession protocol, the distribution of their
transcripts are identical to each other from the view of A. This is true even
if A knows (t, s) that have been exposed during the issuing protocol, which
now have been randomized by r. Thus, the witness (v′, v′′, V, Y ) is independent
from the representation being used and the response (zr, zy, zty, z0, . . . , zn, zs) is
conditioned on the uniformly distributed witness and the challenge value e se-
lected by A. The response is thus uniformly distributed over the representation
of (v′, v′′, V, Y ) and the representation of e(Y, g2)e((v′zy/V ), X) as required. The
same argument applies on the show proof for logical statements, which are the
subset of proof of possession protocols. We do not describe A’s actions as prover
because that does not affect the distribution of the representations chosen by C
in the proof of possession protocol. Thus, we have:
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1] (25)
Game3. A decides the two user identities u1, u2 and the attribute set A∗ ⊆
A0
⋂
A1 which he wishes to challenge upon. C follows A to announce u1, u2 and
A∗, A0, A1 as its challenge to C’s challenge oracle and receives the challenge bit
b ∈ {0, 1} in return. C acts as the man in the middle to pass the messages in
between its challenge oracle as the prover ub and A as the verifier to complete
the protocol pi2,b = (Prove(pk,Ab, credb, A∗),Verify(pk,A∗)) for a polynomially
many time as requested by A. A can also continue to act as the issuer and
verifier as in Game1 and Game2 from time to time. By assumption, witnesses
and responses generated by C’s challenge oracle are uniformly distributed. This
gives:
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] (26)
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Game4. Finally, A outputs a guess b′ on user identity and C sends b′ to its
challenge oracle. If b′ = b, C breaks the WI of the proof of possession protocol
and this gives:
Pr[S4] = εwi (27)
Summing up the equation from (23) to (27), we have εano = εwi. Since C and A
took the same time in the games, we have tano = twi as required. uunionsq
6 Discussion
In this section, we highlight the advantages and limitation of our proposed ABC
system against those built on the SDH-based CL signature in the literature.
6.1 Efficiency
To the best of our knowledge, our ABC system is the first ABC system from
SDH-based CL signature which can efficiently support the logical statements
in the show proof. The previous ABC system has high complexity in the show
proof based on the traditional encoding [15] and they do not support the NOT
statement. Recalling the credential from Au et al.’s basic ABC system [6] as
an example, the traditional encoding fixes each attribute to a specific base such
that:
A = (gm12 . . . g
mL
L+1g
s
1g0)
1
x+e
whose show proof has the same complexity on the AND statement but not on the
OR statements. For the OR statement in the traditional encoding, given the list
L, a prover has to run a complex witness indistinguishability (WI) protocol that
covers every attribute in L. To be precise, the WI protocol requires the prover
to run one and simulate |L| − 1 other proof of possession protocols. Our show
proof for the OR and NOT statements on the contrary, has a significantly lower
complexity due to its algebraic properties. The comparison of the techniques to
support multiple attributes in an ABC system based on SDH-based CL signature
is shown in Table 2 while the concrete protocol complexity is shown in Table 3.
The single attribute ABC systems [33, 2, 29] are excluded but some state-of-the-
art ABC systems [15, 12, 24] are included as a benchmark.
Although the complexity analysis in the tables may not be accurate due to
the different natures of the covered ABC systems, we argue that the result is
adequately generated. Table 2 is a normalized view where we consider only the
asymptotic computational complexity for expensive operations such as the scalar
multiplication (or modular exponentiation in RSA) and pairing operations in a
protocol. The more comprehensive comparison for our proposed ABC system and
other ABC systems is depicted in Table 3 based on the ABC system definitions
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Table 2. Asymptotic protocol complexity in ABC systems based on SDH-based CL
Signature scheme.
Property ABC system
Technique SDH-based CL RSA-based CL SPS
Trad. Encd. Accumulator This Work Prime Encd. Commitment
Possession Complexity O(n) O(n) O(n) O(1) O(n)
Show Proof
Complexity
(l-of-n attributes)
AND Prover O(n− l) O(n− l) O(n− l) O(1) O(n− l)Verifier O(l) O(l) O(l) O(1) O(l)
OR Prover O(nl) O(n− l) O(n− l) O(1) O(n− l)Verifier O(l) O(l) O(l) O(1) O(l)
NOT Prover 7 7 O(n− l) O(1) O(n− l)Verifier 7 7 O(l) O(1) O(l)
Flexible Attribute Indexing 7 7 3 3 3
Schemes [6, 16, 7] [31, 34] Ours [15] [12, 24]
Table 3. Comparison of ABC systems based on SDH-based CL Signature scheme.
ABC system Credential Size Proof of Possession Complexity
ASM [6] 1|G1|+ (n+ 2)|Zp| 3M1(1) + 2M1(n+ 4) + 3P
CKS [16] 2|G1|+ (n+ 2)|Zp| 3M1(1) + 16M1(2) + 4M1(3) + 2M1(n+ 4) + 12P
SNF [31] 5|G1|+ (n+ 2)|Zp| 8M1(1) + 12M1(2) + 6M1(3) + 2M1(5) + 2M1(n) + 15P
ZF [34] 7|G1|+ (n+ 2)|Zp| 8M1(1) + 8M1(2) + 6M1(3) + 2M1(n+ 6) + 16P
BBDT [7] 2|G1|+ (n+ 2)|Zp| M1(1) + 6M1(2) + 2M1(n+ 2)
CG [15] 1|ZN |+ 1|ZNMk|+
1|ZM+2|+ n|ZM/n| 2E(4) + (21k + 3)E(1)
CDHK [12] (n+ 5)|G1|+ 2|G2| 4M1(1) + (30 + 6n)M1(2) +M1(n) + 4M2(1) + 12M2(2) + 42P
FHS [24] (n+ 3)|G1|+
1|G2|+ 2|Zp| 4M1(1) + 30M1(2) +M1(n) +M2(1) + 6M2(2) + 41P
Ours 1|G1|+ (n+ 3)|Zp| 3M1(1) + 2M1(n+ 4) + 3P
Note: We view n as the total of string attributes and finite set attributes in [16, 31, 34].
in Section 3.4. For instance, we include attributes in the credential for every
ABC system where the credential size may be higher than what it was in the
original works. Besides, we exclude computations for proprietary properties such
as user revocation, pseudonymization, accumulator initialization, prime hashing
and so on which are not covered by our definition. In the tables, q and n are the
prime group order and total attributes in a credential. The symbol | · | denotes
the size of an element while M1(·),M2(·), P denotes denote the multi-scalar
multiplications in G1,G2 and pairing operation respectively. For an example,
|G1| is the size of the bilinear group G1 and M1(1) is a scalar multiplication in
G1 with no point addition. For the only RSA-based ABC system [15] in the table,
we use N,M and k to represent the RSA modulus, size of attribute space and
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security parameter respectively. Similarly, we denote the multi-exponentiation
in RSA by the symbol E(·).
From Table 2 and Table 3, we can conclude that our ABC system has a
construction as efficient as that of the ABC system based on traditional encoding,
yet the show proofs are as expressive as the state-of-the-art schemes. This is
justified from our proof of possession and show proofs which, besides the ABC
system based on prime encoding [15], record the lowest asymptotic complexity
in Table 2, and lowest concrete complexity in Table 3. Our ABC system requires
the verifier to compute only three pairings for proof of possession protocol, five
pairings for the show proof on AND and NOT statements, and eight pairings
for OR statement, all independent from the value l. Moreover, our ABC system
supports flexible attribute indexing and proven secure to be fully anonymous. We
also summarize the security properties of ABC systems which are based on SDH-
based CL signature scheme and the signature schemes which share the similar
algebraic property in Table 41. If an ABC system claims only weak anonymity
such that it does not consider blind issuing or assumes a trusted issuer, we mark# for the anonymity in the issuing protocol.
Table 4. Security properties of related ABC systems.
ABC System Signature ABC System Anonymity Security
Unforgeability Impersonation Issue Possession Model
ASM [6]     RO
TAKS [33]     RO
AMO [2]   #  Standard
CKS [16]   # # Standard
SNF [31]   # # Standard
ZF [34]   G# G# Standard
BBDT [7]     Standard
RVH [29]   # # Standard
CDDH [11]   #  Standard
CG [15]   # # Standard
CDHK [12]   # # CRS
FHS [24]     Generic
Ours     Standard
 : security proof provided G#: security claim provided #: no security claim
6.2 Other Applications
We see that our encoding method is applicable not only to ABC system [6,
16, 31, 34, 7, 33, 29, 11], but also to other primitives based on SDH-based CL
1 Camenisch et al.’s [12] and Ringers et al.’s [29] ABC systems consider the security
property of unlinkability but not anonymity.
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signature. For instance, our encoding can be applied on oblivious transfer [13]
and e-cash [5] to support signing on multiple messages. It also allows efficient
construction of access policy for attribute-based signature [4] and access control
[27] schemes. Last but not least, the encoding method works on RSA-based CL
signature as well. Although our encoding does not yield a show proof which is
as efficient as the prime encoding, it avoids the hash to prime procedure which
may be of independent interest.
6.3 Limitation
Although our proposed ABC system is secure in the standard model, its security
will be downgraded to the random oracle model when the proof of possessions
protocol are converted into the NIZK protocol. As observed by Camenisch et al.
[12], this is a limitation of the CL signature and the solution is in the structure-
preserving signature schemes. Abe et al. [1] proposed an automorphic signature
whose NIZK proofs on signature can be proven secure in the common reference
string model. We notice that their automorphic signature is an extension of the
SDH-based CL signature which our ABC system is based on. It is interesting
to know whether our ABC system can enjoy NIZK proof by applying the same
extension to our underlying encoded-message signature scheme.
7 Conclusion
We introduced a collision resistant encoding which resulted in an efficient SDH-
based CL signature for multiple messages. Subsequently, we extend the encoded-
message signature scheme into a multi-show anonymous credential systems and
proves its security against impersonation and anonymity in the standard model.
The proposed ABC system can support show proof on AND, OR and NOT state-
ments besides being the most efficient and secure ABC system built upon SDH-
based CL signature to-date.
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